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ner was more smooth in expression but with unquestionably the same meaning. Can we regard it statesmanship to ignore the certainty of failure in governments based on the exclusion of the class of the intelligent, the property-owners, the accustomed leaders of society, of public opinion, of trade, of commerce and of manufactures? Are sociological and psychological principles considered when to such a perilous experiment is added the transfer of power from one race to another, and from the master to the recent slave? Mr. Sumner excluded "Indians not taxed" from the voting class in his scheme of reconstruction, and found no repugnance, in their case, to discriminating on account of race and color, or to refusing to apply to them the principle of basing government on the consent of the governed.

We could wish that in these and in some other respects Mr. Storey could have got his own consent to a more radical discussion of the principles and doctrines involved in the Sumner-Stevens plan of reconstruction. A careful study of the results and of the reasons for its failure is needful to help us to judge of its original wisdom and conformity with great principles of human nature and of right. In saying that Sumner's attitude in the great debate "secured the *establishment* of equal suffrage without regard to color," the author might almost be suspected of irony, in view of the history of five-and-thirty years. If Sumner was really unflinching in his adherence to the fundamental principles of the Declaration of Independence, the unity of truth is such that its harmony should be capable of proof. A new book upon his life, at this day, would seem a proper place for the analysis of the evidence of this consistency, and Mr. Storey's interesting book would have gained philosophical value by its thorough treatment.

The Downfall of Spain: Naval History of the Spanish-American War. By H. W. WILSON. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1900. Pp. xvi, 452.)

MR. WILSON is well known as the author of *Ironclads in Action*. His clear perception and straight forward style of writing make his books always interesting and instructive. We are in the beginning interested in his view of the *Maine* destruction, and eager to discover how this event was looked upon by one who, like Mr. Wilson, feels it his duty to give every chance to the American side of the question, though himself not specially favorable to our navy. He condemns, on page 23, the Spanish stories of American lack of discipline as fabrication, and comments favorably upon the behavior of the crew after the explosion, but takes occasion to say that "American ideas of discipline are not altogether our ideas." Later on page 36 the author mentions the fact that experts in England, among them Admiral Colomb, thought our navy and the Spanish navy somewhat on an equal footing, and that neither country was strong enough to attack the other. On page 37 the author gives as his opinion that "the Americans showed no exceptional forbearance after the de-

struction of the *Maine*," although most observers of our country at that period commented upon the restraint the country put upon itself, and the dignified and deliberate action of our government with reference to it. It thus appearing that the author has certainly no bias in favor of the Americans, we may look upon his ultimate statement concerning the *Maine* as devoid of prejudice. This statement is as follows: "still it does seem to the author to have established the probability that the *Maine* was destroyed by a mine."

Referring to the strength of the two fleets the author has given a very clear statement of the tonnage, guns, and armor of our navy and that of Spain. It is, however, in comparing the spirit and training of the personnel of the two fleets, American and Spanish, that he shows the clear discernment which has been his chief merit as a critical writer. The second chapter of this work, especially the latter portion of the chapter, which treats of questions of morale and discipline, is well worth reading for its clear and forcible presentation of facts relative to crews and officers of both navies. In discussing "the plan of operations in the West," which is the title of Chapter III., the author makes natural deductions from the reports that were to be obtained. His judgment of the Spanish plans, or lack of them, is very clear and goes to the bottom of the situation. There is something pathetic in his comments on page 98 upon Cervera, his valor above reproach, his chivalry and tenderness of heart, winning for him the admiration even of his enemies. His assertion, however, that Cervera was by nature despondent and a pessimist, and that he in character and temperament resembled Villeneuve, is open to question, as being unjust to Cervera. Villeneuve commanded great fleets out of which much might have been made by an admiral of resolution, in the long period during which he commanded them. But it is doubtful whether any commander, even if he possessed proper energy, could have done anything in the time given to Cervera, with such a force as was at his disposal. To judge Cervera correctly, we should have to know what he knew of the spirit of his subordinates. Sound strategy and daring tactics are useless if the fighting spirit does not permeate the fleet or army concerned, and it does not appear that the Spaniards under Cervera's command, though brave seamen and gallant officers, had that fighting spirit. Those who served against them in Santiago and Porto Rico were, I think, united in this opinion. No love of war for war's sake was observable, no vigor of initiative, on the contrary a profound apathy, a brave but melancholy acquiescence in the decrees of an unkind fate. No more gallant gentlemen, however, are found in the world than the group of officers whose parole the writer took on the quarter-deck of the *Indiana* as his prisoners on the afternoon of the great battle; nor could one have wished to see a more dignified and noble attitude than that of Admiral Cervera at the close of the battle, when first a prisoner in our hands. The writer believes that if Cervera could have been certain of his ships and their equipment, could have felt that his officers and men were yearning after desperate and sanguinary battle, he himself would

have been among the most eager of admirals to join close action with us, even though the odds were against him. This estimate of the man is based upon his bearing and conversation when first brought a prisoner to our ships, while the smoke of battle still hung upon the water.

What he actually did, was or seemed to him the best possible with his poorly equipped vessels. He felt it his duty to avoid battle if possible. In so doing he made one false step, choosing to take his squadron to Santiago rather than to Cienfuegos. It is probable that the cause of his so doing, was that Cienfuegos was nearer to the strength of our fleet than was Santiago, and that he did not reflect that Cienfuegos as a refuge would be supported, if necessary, by the whole strength of the Spanish army in the west of Cuba, while at Santiago he would be practically isolated from all hope of assistance. This mistake in judgment was his only one, but it was very serious in its results. It has been said that his small coal supply made the choice of Santiago necessary, but this is not regarded probable by those best acquainted with the situation.

The author next considers the American plans of operations. In judging of these, it should be remembered that a naval plan, as well as an army plan, must have some reference and relation to the plan of the sister service, and it is probable that Admiral Sampson's first proposal to attack Havana, of which the author speaks, had in view the landing of an army force shortly afterward, to hold the positions and gather the fruits of any success that the navy might have in any attack. It soon became apparent, however, that the army would not be ready to land in any force, not for days and weeks only, but for months. As to the chances of success at Havana, there seems to the writer but little doubt that an attack, made as Admiral Sampson proposed to make it, and beginning the day after war was declared, would have resulted favorably. The western batteries could have been taken in detail, and, with them destroyed or silenced, the city itself would have been at the mercy of the guns of the fleet. What did actually happen was that, in pursuance of this prohibition of the Department, a blockade was undertaken of Havana and adjacent ports, and a waiting policy was inaugurated.

The author has the correct idea of the bombardment of San Juan de Puerto Rico : that it was a reconnaissance necessary in order to make certain that Cervera was not in the harbor, and that Sampson showed wisdom in hauling off as soon as it was discovered that he was not there.

In describing the movement of Shafter's army from Tampa to Daiquiri, the author has departed from his usual rule of depending upon official reports, and has been led astray by newspaper comments. The convoy was not in more straggling order than was contemplated in the plans ; a rear guard was provided for, which it was expected would gather those vessels together which fell behind. This was all foreseen, and the urgency of the Navy Department's despatches to Captain Taylor as to pushing ahead in order to relieve our marines at Guantánamo, made it most unwise for him to delay the rest of the convoy after he had made all arrangements for guarding the slower ships left behind. As it was,

the rear guard arrived and joined Captain Taylor's main body within two hours after his reporting the convoy's arrival to Admiral Sampson. The remarkable success attending this transporting of a great force of 50 ships and 17,000 men without loss or detriment, is the best proof that there was no improper straggling, no disobedience on the part of the transports, no unforeseen confusion or lack of water.

Whether Shafter should have chosen Daiquiri to land; whether he should have come at all to Santiago; are questions of tactics and strategy as to which men differ. It is held by some that consistent strategy would have been to block the harbor-mouth with the *Merrimac*, watch it with a few ships, and then direct Shafter's army as well as the main force of the fleet to other fields of action, such as Havana, Cienfuegos or Porto Rico, and that the strategic alternative of that plan would have been to hold the strength of the fleet at the entrance and bring the army there, but to leave the entrance unblocked, and see to it that it remained open and clear.

However the strategy may be, the proper tactics appear clear and well defined. The army should have held to the coast line, occupied the ridge at Aguadores, moved thence along the ridge upon the Morro, and from that vantage-point, with the aid of the fleet, captured the Socapa and Punta Gorda batteries, when the fleet would have quickly destroyed the mines, entered the harbor and engaged the ships lying there. The movement of the army into the interior, far from the support of the fleet, is regarded by most military students as false tactics.

The book is too full of the details of the campaign to permit all of its good points to be noted in the short space allowed this review. Mr. Wilson touches lightly but clearly upon the *Merrimac* incident, upon the responsibility for our delay in blockading Cervera in Santiago, and is at his best in his discussion of Cervera's correspondence with Blanco, upon which his clear deductions throw a light which dispels much of the doubt which has hung about their relations.

Of the battle of Santiago the author should be allowed to speak without criticism, and no one can read unmoved his lucid description and sometimes dramatic recital of the events of that great day.

H. C. TAYLOR.

The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study. By W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, Ph.D. [Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, Series in Political Economy and Public Law, No. 14.] (Boston: Ginn and Company. 1899. Pp. xv, 520.)

DR. DU BOIS is a negro who was graduated from Fisk and Harvard Universities, studied in Germany, was for a time assistant in sociology in the University of Pennsylvania, and is professor of economics and history in Atlanta University. His history of the *Suppression of the African Slave Trade* was the first volume of the Harvard Historical Studies. He was engaged by the University of Pennsylvania for the special purpose of